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IN THE SUPREME COURT
of the

STATE OF UTAH
DOUGLAS HOLMES, a minor, by
Howard Holmes as guardian ad
litem,
Plaintiff and Respondent,
No. 8726

vs.

J. El·JOS NELSON,
Defendant and Appellant.
BRIEF OF DEFENDANT AND APPELLANT
NATURE OF THE CASE
This is an action brought by Douglas Holmes,
a minor of four years of age, through Howard
Holmes, his guardian ad litem, to recover damages
for injuries sustained on the 11th day of July, 1955
on 800 West Street in Woods Cross, Davis County,
Utah when the plaintiff, Douglas Holmes, was struck
by an automobile driven by the defendant (R. 1-2).
The case was tried to a jury before the Honorable
John F. Wahlquist, Judge of the District Court of
1
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Davis County, on February 21 and 23, 1957. The
Jury returned a verdict of "no cause of ·action" in
favor of the defendant.
A Motion For New Trial was filed by plaintiff's attorney (R. 9) on a number of grounds. On
June 7, 1957 a new trial was granted on the ground
that the verdict was against a clear preponderance
of the evidence ( R. 15).
The defendant filed a Petition For Intermediate Appeal from the order granting a new trial
(R. 56-69). The Petition was granted by order of
this Court on July 31, 1957.
·The question before the Court on the appeal
is whether the trial judge abused his discretion in
granting a new trial, which in turn raises the question of whether the verdict is against a clear preponderance of the evidence.
STATE ME NT OF FACTS
In the Statement Of Facts and Argument which
follows we shaH refer to the parties as they were
referred to in the District Court, that is plaintiff
and defendant. The Record consists of two volun1es,
one of which is made up of the Motions and Pleadings and the like and the other of which is the transcript. We shall refer to the Transcript by the term
"Tr. ____ , and the Record by the term "R. ____ ,.
2
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The accident out of which this action arises
occurred on July 11, 195'5 at about 8:20 P.M. on
800 West Street in Woods Cross, Davis County,
Utah. The scene of the accident is illustrated in a
general way by Defendant's Exhibits "A" through
"D" and Plaintiff's Exhibits 1 through 4, none of
which pictures was taken at the time of the accident (Tr. 45).
Plaintiff resides in a home with his parents
on the west side of 800 West Street, next door to a
church. At a point approximately between the church
and the Holmes property there is a telephone pole
which is located by the side of the road. 800 West
Street extends north and south ( Tr. 15-20, Exhibits
"A" - "E"). The oiled surface of the highway is
approximately 38 feet 6 inches wide ( Tr. 38). The
shoulders on each side of the road are approximately
10 feet wide (Tr. 50). There is a row of trees immediately south of the Holmes property on the west
side of the street (Exhibits "A" - "D"). The point
of impact was approximately 4 feet 6 inches onto
the east side of the road, and at a point approximately directly east of the telephone pole (Exhibit
"C", Tr. 21). The speed limit in the area at the time
was 30 miles per hour ( Tr. 48) .
The defendant was building a house on the
east side of 800 West Street some distance south
of the Holmes property and the point where the
3
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accident occurred (Tr. 3-12). On the evening of
July 11, 1955 he had been out to this house with
his wife and wife's son delivering some material
(Tr. 12). Mter delivering the material the defendant left the area of the house and started north
on 800 West Street. Visibility was good except that
it was in the dusk of the evening, the sun having
set that evening at 8:02P.M. (Tr. 179). The defendant had his car lights on ( Tr. 113) and prior
to the accident had reached the approximate speed
of 20 to 25 miles per hour (Tr.54). As he approached the immediate area of the accident he observed
children on the west side of the road. He also observed a car approaching from the north and observed the children move back to permit the southbound car to pass ( Tr. 22) .
The defendant's car and the south-bound car
passed each other at a point about 125 feet south
of the point of impact (Tr. 23). When the defendant was about 60 to 75 feet from the point of
impact he saw one of the children, the plaintiff,
come running into the street ( Tr. 23-35). The defendant immediately applied his brakes but the child
continued to run diagonally across the street and
towards his automobile. The child was struck by
the left front fender of the automobile. At the time
the child was struck the automobile was traveling
5 to 6 miles per hour (Tr. 23-24).
4
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It afterwards developed that the plaintiff and
some other children had been playing ball in the
Holmes yard by the church (Tr. 53). One of the
children threw the ball and it was missed and went
across the street. There is some confusion in the
Record as to just what happened after that. Mary
Jean Holmes, age 9, a cousin of the plaintiff (Tr.
51-52) testified that a boy named Billy and the
plaintiff took out after the ball (Tr. 54). They
waited for a south-bound car and after it had passed
Billy ran across the street and when he had gotten
across the street Douglas started across ( Tr. 54) .
Robert Holmes, the plaintiff's brother, age 13, testified that he was not sure whether Billy crossed the
street before or after the accident. According to
Donna Stevens, 15 years of age, who lives in the
area, the plaintiff was standing out by the side of
the road all by himself and crossed the road at the
same time she did (Tr. 69), but admits that she
· had had time to cross the street on her bicycle and
get to her home ( Tr. 70), which was some distance
south of the scene of the accident.
The only evidence as to what the defendant saw
or could or should have seen and the manner in
which the accident occurred is that of the defendant
and his wife. Starting on page 3 of the Transcript
the defendant testified:
5
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"A I had been to a home I was constructing for Irvin Layton.
"Q And where is that home?
"A Oh, that is approximately In the
middle of that half-mile block?
"Q And you had pulled- now there are
two homes there together, are there not?
"A Yes.
"Q Which house were you in front of,
the north or south house?
"A I was in front of the north one.
"Q In front of the north one, and you
proceeded to drive your car onto the street
and drive north along the highway.
"A Yes.
"Q Now, how fast - what was the
maximum speed that you went at as you drove
north?
"A The maximum speed, I judge would
be 25 miles per hour.
"Q 25 miles an hour. And at the time
you started up the street you could see people,
individuals, or humans in the vicinity of the
Holmes home and on both sides of the street,
could you not?
"A When I was about half way up
there.
"Q Not until you were half way up?
"A I started to drive up a short distance.
"Q Now, when did you first see Douglas
Holmes?
6
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"A When I was about 60 to 70 feet from
him, approximately.
"Q

60 to 70 feet from him. Now, did
your lights on as you went north?
"A Yes, sir.
"Q Now, you are acquainted with the
fact, are you not, that there is a ward meeting
house immediately north of the Holmes residence?
A Yes, sir."
On page 8 of the transcript he testified:
"Q Now, do you have any idea where
you were, Mr. Nelson: Excuse me, I want
to find this other question. Withdraw that.
Now, as you drove your car north on 8th
West, were there any other automobiles or vehicles in the road?
"A There was one coming from down
the street.
"Q 'That was coming from what direction?
"A Coming from the north.
"Q Coming from the north. And what
time did you pass that vehicle?
"A I passed the vehicle, I estimate
about a hundred feet south of where the point
of impact was.''
you

hav~

On page 14 of the transcript he testified:
"Q Now, what was the first thing you
did after you came out of the Layton home?
"A Turn north.
7
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"Q Let's go back before that. You had
just finished your conversation with Mr. Layton. Now, you are walking out the front door
of the home. What's the first thing you did?
"A I went out and got in the car and
started the motor.
"Q Did you do anything else when you
got in the car without starting the motor?
"A No, sir.
"Q Did you turn the lights on?
"A I turne'd the lights on immediately
after I started the motor.
"Q All right, right after you got the
lights turned on the car started, what was
the next thing that you did?
"A I started my car to moving and
drove off the yard onto the street.
"Q When you got to the road which
direction did you turn?
"A

I turned north.

"Q Now, as you drove north on this
street, did you observe any children. First of
all, let me back up. Do you know where the
Holmes' home is on that street?
"A

Yes.

"Q Do you know where the church is
on that street?
"A

Yes, sir.

"Q Where is the church with reference
to the Holmes' home?
8
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"A Just north of this driveway, the
Holmes' driveway.
On page 22 of the transcript he testified:
"Q Now, as you drove out of this yard
where you had been delivering this material
and starting down the street and starting
north on the street there, did you observe any
other automobiles on the highway?
"A Yes, there was one coming from the
north facing me.
"Q And, what was the first thing that
you noticed about that automobile?
"A He had his lights on.
"Q How far had you traveled-let me
put it this way; about how far were you from
this telephone pole at the time you saw this
car coming from the north?
"A Oh, a hundred and twenty-five feet,
approximately. No, not when I seen it coming
from the north.
"Q When you saw it coming from the
north?
"A I saw it coming from the north before that.
"Q About where were you when you
saw the car coming from the north?
"A Oh, about 200 feet from where I
left.
"Q Now, as you drove north along that
highway, did you see any children up there
in the area of the telephone pole?
9
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"A Yes, at that point I see the children
move away from the headlights of this other
car coming.
"Q Which direction did these children
move that you saw?
"A To the west side of the street.
"Q did you subsequently, or did you
thereafter pass this car that was coming from
the north?
"A You mean the distance?
"Q Did your car pass that car that was
coming from the north?
"A Yes.
"Q Approximately how far were you
from the telephone pole when your car passed
that car that was coming from the north?
"A About a hundred and twenty-five
feet.
"Q Now, did you ever see the boy,
Douglas Holmes prior to the time your car
actually collided with him?
"A Did I see him before the car collided with him? Yes.
"Q Now, where was he when you first
saw him?
"A He was coming off the sidewalk beyond the telephone pole and a little beyond the
Holmes' driveway.
"Q Now, when you say beyond, which
direction do you mean?
"A That would be north of the telephone pole.
Hl
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"Q North of the telephone pole?
"A Yes, the telephone pole.
"Q What was he doing when you first
saw him?
"A He was running toward me. Digging across the road, coming right toward me.
"Q And how far was your car away
from where the accident occurred, the point of
impact, when you first saw this child running
into the street?
"A Oh, approximately 60 feet.
"Q Now, what did you do when you
saw this child?
"A I applied the brakes as soon as I
could react to do so.
"Q Did you observe the child during
the entire time he came across the street?
"A Yes, sir.
"Q Just tell the jury what he was doing as he came across the street.
"A Well, he came running with his
head down, awful low to the ground.
"Q Now, did you observe any action
on the child's part immediately prior to the
impact?
"A As he came in just the headlights he
straightened up and throwed his head up in
the air.
"Q How fast had you been driving as
you came north on this street?
"A About 20 to 25 miles per hour.
11
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"Q Do you have any .estimate as. to
about how fast you were going at the time
the car and the boy collided?
"A Oh, 4 or 5 or 6 miles per hour.
"Q Did you observe what happened to
the boy? First of all, what part of your car
struck the boy?
"A As near as I could tell, the headlight and the bumper.
''Q On what side of the car?
"A \That would be on the left-hand side
of the car.
"Q And, about where in the highway
did the accident occur?
"A Occurred in the right-hand lane of
the highway.
"Q Would that be the east or west lane?
"A That would be the east lane.
"Q What lane were you traveling in
as you drove your car north on the highway?
"A The east lane.
"Q What side of the street did the boy
come from?
"A He came from the west side of the
street, the left-hand side."
Continuing on page 34, he said:
"MR. HANSON: You were at a point
200 feet south of where this accident happened. When you were at a point 200 feet south
of where the accident happened, did you an12
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ticipate that a child was going to run into the
street in front of your car?
"A No, sir.
"THE COURT: After this car passed
you going the other way, you saw the child.
Then where was the child when you first saw
it after the car passed you?
"A The child was coming off the sidewalk north of the Holmes' driveway.
"THE COURT: He was how far off the
sidewalk at that time?
"A Off the sidewalk, oh-directly off
the road probably 10 or 12 feet.
"THE COURT: 10 or 12 feet off the
sidewalk or off the road?
"A Off the road. He was just leaving
the sidewalk when I observed him the first
time.
"THE COURT: How far would he have
to go from there to where you hit him?
"A Oh, about 30 feet, I should say, I
never measured it.
"THE COURT: In other words what you
Lestified to, the little boy traveled 30 feet
while you were traveling 75?
"A Well, I don't know the exact distances.
"'THE COURT: How far away were you
when you saw this little boy?
"A I was approximately 75 feet.
"THE COURT: From the point of impact?
13
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"A Yes, sir.
"THE COURT: And, the little boy would
be how far, 30 feet?
"A Oh, something about that distance.
"THE COURT: Your witness.
"MR. HANSON: I have no question.
"THE COURT: Your witness.
"MR. PATTERSON: And, as I understand you to the Judge's question, Douglas
Holmes ran approximately 30 feet while you
were traveling 75 feet?
"A Well, that could be. I am judging
the distance is all, I don't know measurements."
Mrs. Hattie B. Nelson, the wife of the defendant, testified, beginning on page 196 :
"Q Now, as you were driving down that
highway, did you observe any other cars on
the road?
"A Yes, sir.
"Q And, what car did you observe?
"A 'There was one in the south-bound
lane.
"Q And where was that car when you
first observed it?
"A At about the hedge.
"Q And, will you state whether or not
the car had it's lights on?
"A Yes, sir.
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"Q Will you tell me whether or not you
saw the children before you saw the car or
whether you saw the car before you saw the
children?
"A I seem to see them about the same
time, I think, I might have seen the car-no,
I think I saw them at the same time.
"Q Did you observe what the children
were doing, if anything?
"A They backed off.
"Q By 'backed off' where did they hack
off to?
"A 'Toward the sidewalk.
"Q On which side of the road?
"A On the west side.
"Q And then did you observe this car?
"A Yes.
"Q What did you observe the car do?
''A The car passed us.
"Q Now, where were you with reference to these trees at the time the car passed
you?
"A Passing the trees.
"Q After the car passed you, what happened?
"A We passed the children.
"Q And where were these children that
you passed?
"A In front of the Holmes' property.
15

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

"Q Did you observe children there as
you went by the Holmes' property, I mean,
observe these children as you went by the
Holmes' property.
"A Yes.
"Q How many children did you observe?
"A 'Two.
"Q Where were these children at?
"A On the west side.
"Q And where were they in reference
to the shoulder?
"A On the shoulder.
"Q Now, did you observe any other
child at any time, either on the highway or
in the vicinity of the highway?
"A No, sir.
"Q Did you observe the child that was
later struck?
"A Yes, sir.
"Q Where was that child when you first
observed him?
"A He was running in the south-bound
lane.
"Q And, about where was your car with
reference to these trees at the time you first
observed the child.
"A North.
"Q Where was it with reference to the
hedge?
16
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"A South
"Q Now, when you first saw the child
in the road did you recognize it as a child?
"A No, sir.
"Q What did you think it was?
"A I thought it was a dog.
"Q Now, did you at any time feel the
car in which you were riding slowing down
prior to the time that the child was hit?
"A Yes, sir.
"Q Will you state when the first time
you felt your car slow down?
"A Before we passed the car.
"Q That was the south-bound automobile?
"A Yes.
"Q Did you feel any violent application of the brakes of the car in which you were
riding?
"A As we passed the children.
"Q And that was in front of the Holmes'
property?
"A Yes, sir.
"Q Will you state whether or not you
felt this violent application of brakes prior
to the time you saw the child, or before you
saw it?
"A Before.
"Q Now, did you see the actual impact
between the car and the child?
17
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"A I saw him throw his head up and
I saw his hair in his eyes.
"Q Do you have any estimate as to how
fast your car was traveling at that moment?
"A At the point when we hit him the
car had slowed until we had almost come to
a stop.
Upon the basis of this evidence the jury returned a verdict in defendant's favor. Upon a Motion For New Trial the court set the verdict aside
as being "against a clear preponderance of the evidence" ( R. 15). We believe the verdict was not
"against a clear preponderance of the evidence" and
that it was an abuse of discretion for the trial judge
to grant a new trial. We will discuss the points in
that order.
STATEMENT OF POINTS
POINT I
THE VERDICT OF THE JURY WAS NOT AGAINST
A CLEAR PREPONDERANCE OF THE EVIDENCE.
POINT II
IT WAS AN ABUSE OF DISCRETION FOR THE
TRIAL JUDGE TO GRANT A NEW TRIAL.

ARGUMENT
POINT I
THE VERDICT OF THE JURY WAS NOT AGAINST
A CLEAR PREPONDERANCE OF THE EVIDENCE.

In the case of Roche v. Zee, 1 Utah (2d) 193,
264 P. ('2d) 855, which involved an appeal from
lR
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a Motion To Dismiss made by the defendant, which
the court granted after the jury had returned averdict in the defendant's favor, this court dismissed
the appeal on the ground that the appeal should have
been taken from the verdict rather than the motion.
This court held that: "The jury having found for
defendant, the review should be in the light most
favorable to defendant." The case is not in point
except that it restates the rule which should have
guided the trial court's review of the evidence in
ruling upon the motion for a new trial and the rule
which we submit should guide this court in its review of the evidence to determine whe'ther or not
the trial judge erred, or that he abused his discretion in granting a new trial.
Estimates as to the distance in which the defendant's car could have stopped vary from 53 feet
( Tr. 113) , assuming a road surface having the
highest coefficient of friction (Tr. 129), to 6'5 feet
( Tr. 191) , assuming there was gravel on the surface of the road and a coefficient of friction of
55<Jo. Since there was evidence that there was gravel
on the surface of the highway and the defendant
stated that the plaintiff was 60 to 75 feet away
at the time he started into the highway, we might
argue that the court should assume the shortest
distance and lowest coefficient of friction and that
the defendant, even discounting perception time but
19
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including only braking distance and reaction time,
could not possibly have stopped his automobile less
than 5 feet beyond the point of impact. We do not,
however, feel that this Court should engage in such
hair splitting. As was said in Howard v. Ringsby
Truck Lines, 2 Utah (2d) 65, 269 P. (2d) 295, in
which the argument was made that a truck could
have been stopped before colliding with a jeep and,
assuming plaintiff's evidence, the defendant would
have had 2.56 seconds in which to react:
''During this brief interval, Byington had
to react to the danger, determine a course of
action and stop a truck traveling 45 miles per
hour. We are in accord with the following
apropos statement made by the court in Rollison v. Wabash R. Co., 252 Mo. 525, 160 S.W.
994, 999:
"' * * * To predicate negligence on two
seconds of time is in and of itself a nlonumental refinement. We cannot adjudicate negligence on such pulse beats and hair splitting,
such airy nothings of surmise.' "
The court went on to say:
"The showing of a mere possibility that
the accident might have been avoided is insufficient."
That case is also important in that it also recognizes what might be termed "perception time".
The court said:
"Human reactions are not instantaneous
20
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and the time required to react varies according to the nature of the danger and the surrounding circumstances."
As brought out by· the evidence ( Tr. 119) , perception time is the time required to perceive and understand the dangerous situation as distinguished
from reaction time, which is the time it takes for an
individual to react to danger after he actually sees
and is aware of the danger. As we have stated, liability or the lack of it should not be predicated on
seconds of time or fractions of feet. To do so would
be to assume that witnesses are exactly correct in
their estimates of time and distances, which is obviously never the case. Rather, we should look at
the evidence in a general way. Looking at this evidence in a general way we find no evidence of excessive speed on the part of the defendant. It is
admitted that the defendant saw the children on the
side of the road and the plaintiff prior to the accident. There is no evidence of any failure to keep a
proper lookout. As the defendant approached the
area in which the accident occurred another car was
approaching from the north and the defendant observed the children move back to allow the southbound car to pass. There was nothing in his actions
to that point on which to predicate any findings of
negligence. Since the children had observed and surrendered the right of way to the south-bound auto21
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mobile, it was only logical to assume they would
likewise surrender the right of way to the northbound automobile.
Some time after the· defendant's car had
passed the south-bound automobile at a point
100 to 125 feet from the place where the plaintiff was struck, the plaintiff started across the
highway. The defendant estimates that he was
60 to 75 feet from the point of impact when this occurred. It would take some time thereafter for the
defendant to realize that the plaintiff intended to
cross the road in front of his car and was apparently
unaware of the approach of his vehicle. When he
came to that realization the defendant would still
have to react to the situation and stop his vehicle.
If the defendant was traveling at a speed of 25 miles
per hour, or roughly 37¥2 feet per second, he had
only two seconds in which to perceive the danger,
react to it and stop his vehicle if we assume he was
75 feet from the point of impact at the time. Of
course, if he was traveling at a faster rate of speed
or the distance was less then the defendant would
have even less time.
Whether the defendant might conceivably have
been able to stop his car and was, therefore, negligent in not doing so is not, in the real sense, the
issue involved here. The jury, whose duty it is to
find the facts, has already resolved that issue by
its verdict in favor of the defendant. The question
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that is involved, regardless of what our personal
opinions may be, is whether or not they might, as
reasonable men, have resolved the issue as they did
and, having resolved the issue, whether or not that
determination is contrary to the preponderance of
the evidence.
We submit that the finding of the jury is not
only the most logical one, but any other conclusion
requires a process of mental gymnastics not warranted by the evidence.
!The only other evidence which may have some
bearing on the issues of negligence is the fact that
the defendant, in stopping his vehicle, left skid
marks, the overall length of which was 52 feet 3
inches ( Tr. 21) . It should be pointed out, however,
that these measurements were from the place on
the road where the skid marks started to the place
where they stopped, which was at the front wheel
of the vehicle and included the length of the
automoblle and a short break of approximately 3 feet in length where there were no skid
Pettingill v. Perkins, 2 Utah (2d) 2'66, 272 P.
Alvarado v. Tucker, 2 Utah (2d) 16, 268 P. (2d)
986. In the case referred to the defendant struck an
eleven year old girl who started across the street
but, seeing a car headed north, ran along parallel to
it until it passed her and then ran behind it westward across the street and directly into the path of
the defendant who was driving from the north. The
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defendant laid down 50 feet of skid marks, including the length of the car, which indicated a speed
from 25 to 30 miles per hour. The court pointed out
that this evidence did not sustain a finding that the
defendant was traveling at an excessive rate of
speed, the court being entitled to assume the lesser
rate. The court went on to say:
"Even if the plaintiff were correct in
her contention that the evidence would justify a finding of 5 or 10 miles per hour in
excess of the speed limit, she would still be
faced with the necessity of proving that such
excess of speed was the proximate cause of
·
the injury."
The evidence in this case is that the speed limit
in the area concerned was 30 miles per hour, so that
we have no evidence of excessive speed. Furthermore, there is no evidence except that which is based
on conjecture and assumption, not warranted by the
evidence, that the defendant could have stopped his
car in sufficient time to avoid the accident even if
traveling at a lesser rate of speed. While the facts in
Pettingill v. Perkins, 2 Utah (2d) 266, 272 P.
(2d) 185, which involved the death of a 26 month
old boy who was killed when struck by an automobile, are not in point, the concluding language of
that case might well summarize the evidence in this
case. The court said:
"The jury might well have found that
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there was no negligence on the part of the defendant. It would take a pull and a long
stretch to say the evidence required the conclusion that defendant was guilty of negligence which proximately caused the death of
the child."
POINT II
IT WAS AN ABUSE OF DISCRETION FOR THE
TRIAL JUDGE TO GRANT A NEW TRIAL.

Ordinarily the deliberations which go on in a
jury room are inviolate and we must presume that
the jury considered those issues which were put to
them and followed the instructions of the court in
that regard. That is not the case here, however.
After the verdict had been returned and the court
dismissed the foreman of the jury and one other
juror desired to discuss the case with the court, and
the following conversation occurred (Tr. 216):
"JURY FOREMAN: What the jury
wanted to do was award the plaintiff his damages, but felt he would be entitled to no other
damages, but then they would ·have been rendering the man guilty of something that was
still a question in our minds.
"MR. HANSON: Do I understand that
there was a question in your minds as to
whether or not this defendant was guilty of
negligence?
"THE COURT: Let me ask this.
"MR. HANSON: I didn't mean to interfere.
"THE COURT: Did the six people that
25
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signed this verdict sign the verdict because
they feel the man was not negligent?
"FOREMAN: That's right.
"THE COURT: Or because they felt
that the damages were nominal?
"FOREMAN: No, because he was not
guilty of negligence.
"THE COURT: Is that the opinion of the
six that signed?
"FOREMAN: Yes.
"THE COURT: Was there any method of
chance used?
"FOREMAN: No.
"THE COURT: No method of chance
whatsoever?
"FOREMAN: No.
"THE COURT: There were some of them
that would have liked to have awarded averdict for specials only?
"FORMEAN: They felt the man had a
moral obligation.
"THE COURT: But not a legal obligation?
"FOREMAN: Not a legal obligation. In
other words, they felt he was not negligent
in his actions, but that he did have a moral
obligation. That was the question the jury
wanted to ask you that we were not permitted
to ask.
"THE COURT: If that is their opinion,
the verdict is correct. Is there further enquiries of the foreman of the jury?
26
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"MR. KUNZ: Mr. Beazer would like to
have a question here.
"MR. BEAZER: That was my question.
"MR. KUNZ: Mr. Beazer, would there
have been sufficient on a verdict - would
there have been sufficient people agree on a
verdict to a ward the special damages?
"MR. BEAZER: I think there would.
That's correct.
"FOREMAN: Well, at one time during
our discussion there was.
"THE COURT: Was there ever six of
them who felt that Mr. Nelson was negligent?
"1\XR. BEAZER: No.
"THE COURT: Your verdict is correct.
It may be filed."
This conversation is set out to illustrate that
the jury understood the issues which they were to
deliberate. It appears that they were sympathetic
in that they wanted to award the plaintiff his damages but felt that in rendering such a verdict they
would be finding the defendant guilty of negligence
and that they did not return a verdict because the
six people who signed the verdict were of the opinion that the defendant was not negligent. We have
devoted the first part of our argument to a discussion of why the jury might reasonably so find, and
will not repeat that argument here except to reiterate our conviction that their verdict was justified
by the evidence.
27
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Since the trial court gran ted a new trial on only
one theory, that the verdict of the jury was contrary to a preponderance of the evidence, and so
indicated by this order, we do not have to speculate on what the court may have had in mind, but in
determining whether or not he abused his prerogative limit our inquiry to that one point. In this respect the case is similar to Bowden v. Denver & Rio
Grande Western Railroad Company, 2 Utah (2d)
444, 286 P. (2d) 240. In that case the court granted
a new trial upon the ground that two particular instructions were erroneous. The court held that the
instructions when read together with the other instructions were not prejudicial. The court went on:
"Still addressing ourselves to the specific ground upon which the new trial was
granted, as distinguished from the general
discretion reposed in the trial court, which
herein was expressly renounced, there is yet
another aspect of this case which we believe
should have dissuaded that court from granting a new trial, even if it thought technical
error had been committed. There is a most
important difference between this case and
the Butz case hereinabove discussed. In the
latter, the trial court had deprived the plaintiff of a trial by jury and resolved all of the
issues of fact against him as a matter of law,
whereas in this case the matter was submitted
to a jury and the facts were found against
the plaintiff. We reaffirm our con1mitment
that ' "The right of jury trial * * * is * * * a
28
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right so fundamental and sacred to the citizen * * * (that it) should be jealously guarded by the courts."' But once having been
granted such right and a verdict rendered,
it should not be regarded lightly nor over:..
turned without good and sufficient reason;
nor should a judgment be disturbed merely because of error. Only when there is error both
substantial and prejudicial, and when there
is a reasonable likelihood that the result would
have been different without it, should error
be regarded as sufficient to upset a judgment
or grant a new trial."
Since the court in granting the new trial in this
case has put it solely on the ground of the verdict's
being contrary to the preponderance of the evidence,
the court would have appeared to have limited the
basis for granting the motion and we are not faced
with the broad powers of discretion which are ordinarily vested in the trial court.
We agree with the holding in the case of Bowden
v. Denver & Rio Grande Western Railroad Company, supra. If a decision which a jury, after careful consideration, has arrived at and which is warranted under the evidence is set aside without good
grounds for doing so, that is, merely because the
trial court did not happen to agree with the result
reached, then the jury system becomes a nullity.
There is yet another element that should be
considered. The trial of an action of the nature and
importance of the case we are considering repre1

29
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sents a considerable investment of time and money
not only on the part of the parties and their counsel
but also on the part of the State, who provides the
forum, the officers of the court and the jury. The
investment does not end here, however. As lawyers
and judges, who by their daily intimate association
with these problems, we become somewhat calloused
and indifferent to what they represent to the parties
involved. We are prone to forget the worry and mental anguish, the strife and contention and the disillusionment which parties involved sometimes suffer. This is no indictment. Rather it is a necessary
adjunct of a system which provides them with an
opportunity for a fair and impartial hearing of their
grievance. It does suggest, however, that lawsuits
should have an end; that these rna tters should be
put to rest; and that the hopes and fears of the participants should not be resurrected unless the system has failed in its basic responsibility, that is to
provide a fair and impartial hearing.
Where the matters in dispute have been presented to a jury and where those matters have been
decided by a jury upon competent evidence from
which a jury of reasonable persons could so conclude,
the verdict should not be set aside merely because the
court happens to disagree with the result or because
the jury might, on some theory or another, have
found otherwise. As was said in Reynolds v. TV. TV.
Clyde ~Company, 5 Utah (2d) 151, 298 Pac: (2~d)
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530, in which the verdict reached depended upon
which of two eye witnesses the jury believed:
"There were but two eye witnesses to the
incident, the plaintiff and the defendant flagman. Their testimony was diametrically opposed, and there was more than ample evidence which, if believed by the jury, would
support its verdict. We sustain such verdicts
as a matter of course, as many times we have
said we must do. Only those verdicts that appear to be unsupported by any credible evidence that would justify them in the minds of
reasonable men, do we disturb. That is the
jury system. There is no lack of such evidence
here, but on the contrary, there is sufficient
competent evidence from which a jury of
reasonable persons could conclude there was
non-negligence on the part of defendants and/
or contributory negligence on the part of
plaintiff, or an absence of cause and effect.
"Plain tiff presents her case on appeal by
reciting facts tending most favorably to prove
her claim. The opposite approach must be
adopted, and it hardly bears repeating that in
a case like this the factual situation will be
reviewed on appeal in a light most favorable
to the party prevailing below.''
CONCLUSION
The claims of the plain tiff who sought to recover from the defendant for injuries he sustained
in an auto-pedestrian accident were presented to a
jury for its decision under instructions of which,
as far as we are aware at this time, plaintiff has
no complaint. The jury understood the issue before
31
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them, as indicated by the conversation between two
of the jurors and the court which appears in the
record. The jury, after a careful consideration, although sympathetic with the plaintiff, decided that
the defendant was not negligent. Their decision
is supported by evidence from which they could
reasonably so conclude. In fact, the preponderance of
the evidence argues in favor of their decision. Nevertheless the trial court, who apparently disagreed
with their decision, set their verdict aside and granted a new trial. His actions in this regard were not
only contrary to the weight of the evidence but failed
to take in to account every presumption which should
have been made in favor of the correctness of that
verdict. In doing so the court expressly limited the
ground on which he made his decision, to the only
issue which is now before the court, that is whether
or not the verdict is against the preponderance of
the evidence.
It is sub1nitted that the court erred in so doing.
in so doing.
Respectfully submitted,
EDWIN

B. CANNON
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